

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWELFTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Friday, 30 March 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. ZORIN

(Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics)

62-11810

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. de MELLO-FRANCO  
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS  
Mr. de A. ARARIPE

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Mr. V. PALINE  
Mr. N. MINTCHEV  
Mr. G. GUELEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON  
U Tin MAUNG  
U Aye LWIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY  
Mr. R. TAIT  
Mr. J.F.M. BELL

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK  
Mr. E. PEPICH  
Mr. M. ZEMLA  
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. GEBRE-EGZY  
Mr. M. HAMID  
Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. M.J. DESAI  
Mr. A.S. LALL  
Mr. A.S. MEHTA  
Mr. C.K. GAIROLA

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. A. CAGIATI  
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI  
Mr. F. LUCIOLI-OTTIERI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE

Nigeria:

Mr. A.A. ATTA

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI  
Mr. M. LACHS  
Mr. M. BIEN  
Mr. W. WIECZÓREK

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU  
Mr. C. SANDRU  
Mr. E. GLASER  
Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG  
Baron C.H. von PLATEN  
Mr. H. BLIX

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN  
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN  
Mr. I.G. USACHEV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN  
Mr. A. El-ERIAN  
Mr. M.S. AHMED  
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER  
Sir Michael WRIGHT  
Mr. J.S.H. SHATTOCK  
Mr. J.H. LAMBERT

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. A. DEAN

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. R.I. SPIERS

Mr. S.H. McINTYRE

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUFI

Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The twelfth meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament is called to order. I should now like to speak as representative of the Soviet Union.

At the last meeting we reached agreement in principle concerning the aims of general and complete disarmament, and acknowledged the need to incorporate these aims in the preamble to the treaty on general and complete disarmament which the Committee has begun to prepare. It emerged from the discussion that the draft preamble submitted by the Soviet Union meets with general support, and we agreed on the procedure for producing the final draft preamble to be presented to the Committee for approval. We now have to speed in every possible way the work of co-ordinating the text of the preamble, and thus to demonstrate to the peoples that the Committee has really got down to practical business.

In accordance with the procedure of work adopted by the Committee, we will now discuss the other provisions of the future agreement on general and complete disarmament. I intend today to speak on the general provisions concerning the obligations of States with regard to general and complete disarmament. These general provisions are set out in article 1, paragraph 1, of the draft treaty (ENDC/2) submitted by the Soviet Government for consideration by the Committee. Analogous provisions are to be found also in the programme for disarmament (ENDC/6) presented by the United States President, Mr. Kennedy, at the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly on 25 September 1961.

It goes without saying - and I do not think I need expatiate on this - that before we determine the specific obligations of States with regard to every particular disarmament measure at each of the stages, the general scope of these obligations should be set out in the introductory part of the treaty. I do not see any need to go into detailed arguments on this point, because it seems to us to have been admitted by the United States and by other States alike, judging by the disarmament programme which the United States has submitted. It has also been admitted in the Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5) which were unanimously approved by the General Assembly.

The main function of article 1, paragraph 1, of the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament is to determine the general scope of the measures for general and complete disarmament, to establish what is the mandatory and indispensable part of such disarmament, and to outline the methods for implementing general and complete disarmament.

(The Chairman, USSR)

Paragraph 1 of article 1 expresses first the idea that, for implementation of an agreement on general and complete disarmament a definite and specific time-limit should be set. The Soviet Government considers it possible to implement the whole programme of general and complete disarmament, and totally to eliminate the military apparatus of States, in four years. Our calculation and, furthermore, our practical experience of reconversion after the Second World War have convinced us that this period is realistic and does not raise any insurmountable difficulties for States. In the general discussion other periods have also been mentioned. In particular the Chairman of the Indian delegation, Mr. Menon, pointed out in his statement of 20 March (ENDC/5, page 28) that the Government of India has come to the conclusion that it is possible to implement general and complete disarmament in four to five years. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, Lord Home, informed the Committee (ibid., p.13) that in his delegation's opinion, which we quite understand is shared by the United States delegation, a programme of general and complete disarmament can be fulfilled in nine years.

We do not intend now, at this stage, to go into details about which of the periods suggested is the most readily acceptable. We should like, however, to emphasize one idea to which we attach great importance. Among all delegations there is general agreement that a definite, firm time-limit, as short as possible, should be fixed for implementing general and complete disarmament. It seems to me that we could usefully record this agreement, because in the past there have been certain differences over this question among the various delegations and States. Having made these observations, I shall now pass to the substance of article 1 of the Soviet draft treaty.

We consider that the treaty must set out clearly the most important measures constituting general and complete disarmament. Every party to the treaty would then have a clear picture of what it must do, and where it should direct its main efforts to fulfil the disarmament programme. I should like to stress that this part of the treaty must state clearly and decisively - really clearly and decisively - the essential measures of disarmament. For if we omit any of those measures, evade the abolition of any type of armaments or armed forces, and leave a loophole for the retention of any part of the military apparatus of States, the treaty will not serve its purpose and cannot lead to general and complete

(The Chairman, USSR)

disarmament. During previous meetings of the Committee all its members have emphasized that disarmament must be general and complete, and that only in this way can genuine, lasting peace be secured. In our view it cannot be otherwise. For point 1(a) of the Agreed Principles for general and complete disarmament, which have been accepted not only by all members of the Committee but also by all Members of the United Nations, states that disarmament is to be general and complete. The Soviet Government was in fact guided by this rule when preparing its draft treaty.

We could not, of course, confine ourselves to simple repetition of the wording of the Principles agreed between the Soviet Union and the United States and approved by the General Assembly. The Agreed Principles are an important stage, but one which has been passed. Our starting-point, and the task of this Committee, is not simply to go over old ground, but to move forward and interpret these general principles by wording them more specifically and precisely. This we have done in our draft treaty.

The first-sub-paragraph of article 1 of our treaty provides for "the disbanding of all armed forces and the prohibition of their re-establishment in any form whatsoever". I should like to point out to Committee members the essential affinity between our wording and the first half of objective (a) of the fourth paragraph of the United States programme of 25 September 1961. It is true that this sub-paragraph of the United States programme contains a reservation concerning the armed forces which would remain after the implementation of general and complete disarmament "to preserve internal order and for contributions to a United Nations Peace Force". We agree that after the implementation of general and complete disarmament certain contingents should remain at the disposal of States to preserve internal order and be made available, when necessary, to the Security Council in order to maintain universal peace. In the succeeding provisions of our draft treaty we propose suitable words for this purpose. It should, however, be borne in mind that the question of completely disbanding armed forces and of taking measures to prohibit their re-establishment differs radically from the question of what forces States will have at their disposal to preserve internal order and discharge their commitments to the United Nations to maintain universal peace. We consider it necessary to treat these questions separately in an agreement on general and complete disarmament so as to give the agreement the greatest clarity and precision.

(The Chairman, USSR)

Article 1, paragraph 1, second item of our proposals, which defines the scope of the measures for general and complete disarmament, speaks of "the prohibition and destruction of all stock-piles, and the cessation of the production of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, including atomic, hydrogen, chemical, biological and radiological weapons" (ENDC/2, p.2). This wording, as members of the Committee can easily see, fully accords with paragraph 3(b) of the Agreed Principles for general and complete disarmament. The difference between them is only in their wording.

In the Programme for Disarmament submitted by the United States on 25 September 1961, sub-paragraph (b) of the fourth paragraph of the introductory part sets forth as an objective of general and complete disarmament the "elimination from national arsenals of all armaments, including all weapons of mass destruction" (ENDC/6).

I should like to point out particularly that the Agreed Principles for disarmament stress the need to eliminate all - I emphasize the "all" - stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction. The United States document also speaks of destroying all stockpiles. From this we conclude that there is general consent between us that the agreement on general and complete disarmament which we have begun to draft must prohibit nuclear and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction and call for the total destruction of all stockpiles.

The next sub-paragraph of the first paragraph of our article 1 covers "the destruction and cessation of the production of all means of delivering weapons of mass destruction to their targets". I think that all members of the Committee agree that this provision is necessary. I need only add that it is contained in paragraph 3(c) of the Agreed Principles, and also that the idea of the need to destroy all means of delivering nuclear weapons also appears in the United States disarmament programme.

The fourth sub-paragraph concerns "the dismantling of all kinds of foreign military bases, and the withdrawal and disbanding of all foreign troops stationed in the territory of any State." (ENDC/2\*). Why do we consider it necessary to include in the treaty a provision on the dismantling of foreign military bases? Arguments are sometimes to be heard that one should approach, so to speak, with the same yardstick foreign military bases and national bases situated in the



(The Chairman, USSR)

national territory of States. Such arguments seem to us absolutely unfounded. Military bases, as well as the stationing of foreign troops in the territory of other States, are a peculiar military institution of its own kind engendered by the cold war and, in its turn, engendering tension in relations between States. The main purpose of foreign military bases in alien territory is not to defend the State which possesses such bases. Foreign military bases are, above all, strong-points for aggressive hostile actions. With the development of modern military technology such bases cannot play any role in the defence of the national territory of the States which maintain their bases and troops in foreign territory. They can only have the effect of extending a war and drawing an ever larger number of States into it. All this makes it necessary to include in the draft treaty a provision on the dismantling of foreign military bases in alien territory.

The Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations envisage the dismantling of bases in general. I have already said that our task is to embody the Agreed Principles in a concrete form and it is, therefore, necessary to include definite provisions concerning the dismantling of foreign military bases in alien territory.

National bases in national territory will, of course, be dismantled in accordance with the provision for the disbanding of all national armed forces, which I have previously explained. When such disbanding has been carried out, military camps, barracks and bases will of course disappear. This is so obvious that it hardly requires any further explanation.

The next two sub-paragraphs of paragraph 1, article 1, provide for "the abolition of any kind of military conscription for citizens" and "the cessation of military training of the population and the closing of all military training institutions". These sub-paragraphs translate into terms of the specific obligations of States the principle that general and complete disarmament should be such that armed forces would never be re-established. In these sub-paragraphs, as a matter of fact, we develop and give a clearer interpretation to paragraph 3(d) of the Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations. The United States programme does not contain a specific provision to this effect although, in respect of armed forces, it speaks of "the prohibition of their re-establishment in any form whatsoever" (ENDC/6\*). I think everyone agrees that not enough is

(The Chairman, USSR)

said about the prohibition of the re-establishment of armed forces. It is necessary to provide for such undertakings by States as would preclude the possibility of re-establishing armed forces. One of the conditions for this is to cease calling up citizens for military service and giving them military training. This is precisely the aim of the two sub-paragraphs of the Soviet draft treaty which I have just quoted.

We also make provision for "the abolition of war ministries, of general staffs and their local agencies, and of all other military and para-military establishments and organizations". This formulation of ours develops the principle laid down in paragraph 3(d) of the Agreed Principles. The United States programme does not, unfortunately, contain a similar provision. However, the general idea contained in sub-paragraph (a) of the fourth paragraph of the introductory part of the United States programme makes it possible to say that the United States, apparently, also shares our views on this point.

The penultimate sub-paragraph of article 1, paragraph 1 refers to "the elimination of all types of conventional armaments and military equipment, and the cessation of their production, except for the production of strictly limited amounts of agreed types of light firearms for the equipment of the police (militia) contingents to be retained by States after the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament". This provision is in accordance with paragraph 3(a) of the Agreed Principles. It has something in common with sub-paragraph (b) of the fourth paragraph of the United States disarmament programme of 25 September 1961. After general and complete disarmament has been completed, all armies disbanded, nuclear weapons and all means of delivering them destroyed and all loopholes permitting the re-establishment of armed forces blocked, there will be no need to manufacture conventional armaments. It will only be necessary to retain production of light firearms and, moreover, on a limited scale, which will be determined by the requirements of the contingents whose purpose it is to maintain internal order in States. For this purpose light firearms are quite sufficient.

The last sub-paragraph of paragraph 1 provides for "the discontinuance of the appropriation of funds for military purposes, whether from State budgets or from organizations or private individuals". In this case, too, we are making paragraph 3(e) of the Agreed Principles more precise. Paragraph 3(e) simply mentions the discontinuance of military expenditures. We wish to block all loopholes so

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as to prevent the assignment of funds for military purposes. It is known that this can be done either through the State or through organizations and private individuals. We should learn from past experience and exclude the possibility of any evasion of an agreement concluded by us.

These are the provisions of article 1, paragraph 1.

I now turn to article 1, paragraph 2, of our draft treaty. Its intention is that after the completion of general and complete disarmament only strictly limited contingents of police (militia) will remain at the disposal of States. These contingents, as the paragraph states, are "intended for the maintenance of internal order and for the discharge of their obligations with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security, under the United Nations Charter and under the provisions of Article 37 of the present Treaty". I have already repeatedly referred to this question and therefore see no need to explain it again. Representatives who have spoken in the Eighteen Nation Committee have emphasized the need for general and complete disarmament and for leaving at the disposal of States only such armed contingents as would be strictly limited by the requirements for maintaining internal order.

As regards article 1, paragraph 3. of our draft treaty, its main idea is that disarmament should be carried out in three successive stages. Transition to a subsequent stage shall take place after adoption by the international disarmament organization of a decision confirming that all the measures of the preceding stage have been carried out and verified, and that verification measures necessary for the next stage have been prepared for operation. With this provision we remove the grounds for the dissatisfaction which has often been expressed in regard to our previous drafts, which did not contain a sufficiently clear statement regarding the nature of transition from one stage to another. We have now set this down with the utmost clarity.

In connexion with this paragraph, I should like to make just one observation, namely, that in the course of the general debate all delegations agreed that general and complete disarmament should be carried out in three stages. This is also the starting point of the United States disarmament programme. We may therefore conclude that there will be no difficulty in agreeing also on article 1, paragraph 3, of the draft treaty submitted by us.

(The Chairman, USSR)

In conclusion, I should like to refer to article 1, paragraph 4. It expresses the idea contained in paragraph 5 of the Agreed Principles. The majority, if not all, of the delegations here in this Conference room have spoken of the need to carry out general and complete disarmament in such a way that no State or Group of States would gain any military advantage and that security would be ensured equally for all parties to the Treaty. Consequently, in this case, too, we could, without further delay, record agreement among us on this important principle.

The Soviet delegation has explained one more part of its draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. The comparison which I have made between our draft and the Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations, as well as with the United States disarmament programme presented by President Kennedy in the General Assembly on 25 September 1961, demonstrates that we are agreed in principle in regard to the general scope of disarmament measures and the basic methods of their implementation. It would therefore be desirable, acting in the spirit of co-operation in which we have conducted our negotiations up till now, that we should reach the earliest possible agreement also on this part of the treaty on disarmament, which defines the general obligations of States in regard to general and complete disarmament.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I have listened with great attention to the very interesting remarks which have just been made by my Soviet colleague - indeed, an English text of those remarks has now been distributed to us. We shall compare the substance of these remarks with our own plan of 25 September 1961 and I shall comment on them at an early plenary meeting of this Conference.

I would like to address my remarks this morning to the statement made yesterday by the representative of Czechoslovakia. He seemed to take exception to the fact that in my statement yesterday I had moved directly into the heart of one of the major and substantive areas of disarmament. The representative of Czechoslovakia implied that there was something wrong with this procedure, that it somehow contravened the agreement on our programme of work, that it was too global in approach and took us back again to the stage of general debate, and that this would disorganize our discussions. The representative of

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Czechoslovakia said that at this stage we should confine the discussion to the preamble. I believe it would advance the orderly procedure of the Committee if I were at this time to make clear my exceptions to the points made by the representative of Czechoslovakia.

I submit that the manner of proceeding which I outlined yesterday not only is fully consistent with the agreed programme, but indeed is the most logical, the most orderly and the most efficient one.

In his statement before this Conference on 27 March, our Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, set forth the views of the United States on the specific programme of work for the following weeks. He said:

"In the plenary Conference we believe that we should identify the major substantive areas of a disarmament programme and begin, as quickly as possible, to determine how these will be dealt with in an overall agreement on general and complete disarmament. We should, as we have agreed, consider the Soviet approach in each of these areas, as set forth in its draft proposal of 15 March. Simultaneously, we would consider the approach in each of these areas as set forth in the United States programme of 25 September 1961, which will, in the near future, be resubmitted in more detailed and elaborated form."

(ENDC/PV.10, page 12)

We submit that this approach will take us directly to the heart of the issues which we have to resolve here if our draft agreement on general and complete disarmament is to have any meaning or to bear any fruit, as I am sure it will. But one does not begin to build a house until the plans have been drawn up. What my delegation is trying to do is, as soon as possible, to focus the discussion in this Committee on solving some of those substantive issues which will give the framework to the agreement we seek, in order to prevent the Committee from wasting valuable time in discussing and drafting texts before we have agreed upon the substance of what it is we wish to accomplish.

When the bulk of these basic substantive issues have been resolved, then it may be a logical and acceptable procedure for the Conference to go through the various draft treaties that have been submitted, paragraph by paragraph.

(Mr. Lean, United States)

I repeat that I shall not comment this morning in detail upon what the representative of the Soviet Union has just said. But, and I mention this merely by way of illustration, as I listened to him I realized that one cannot discuss intelligently, for example, article 1, paragraph 2, of the Soviet draft treaty unless one also discusses the various substantive provisions of article 37 of that draft; and one cannot discuss that article intelligently unless one also takes up the question of how we are to set up the United Nations peace force and how that force is to be made up - whether of contingents that are to be entirely within the framework of the United Nations, or of contingents from national armies - and unless we also take up the question of how these contingents are to be armed and whether the United Nations peace force will be subject, as article 37 of the Soviet draft treaty provides, to Article 43 of the Charter of the United Nations.

I mention this not because I am going to discuss the substance of what the representative of the Soviet Union said this morning - I shall reserve that to a later date - but because I wish to point out that it would be utterly impossible to go through a draft treaty line by line until we have reached agreement on what it is we wish to accomplish - especially when these particular parts of the treaty refer to substantive provisions in subsequent articles.

As the Conference is aware, we have before us two contrasting disarmament programmes. One of these is in the format of a draft treaty. As we agreed in connexion with the programme of work, the fact that one proposal is in the format of a treaty or a treaty outline does not necessarily confer upon it any priority of consideration, any more than it would be proper for the United States to demand priority for its programme of 25 September, which we believe to be very carefully formulated, merely because it was submitted first. We feel that it would be best to try to work out a common agreement by comparing each of the major substantive areas of the two drafts that have been proposed to the Conference. These major substantive areas are set forth in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of 20 September and in the resolutions for which we all voted in the United Nations General Assembly and which we have agreed must be included in any disarmament programme or treaty. This procedure will bring us immediately into the most important areas of discussion, without our taking up too much time on subordinate drafting details or on texts in which subsequent provisions are

(Mr. Dean, United States)

referred to on whose substance we have not reached agreement. When we reach agreement on the way in which each of these major substantive areas will be handled in any agreed programme or treaty, we can turn our attention to the specific problems of drafting.

I submit that the problem of whether nuclear weapons production is to be limited or completely stopped in the first stage is a substantive and not a drafting problem. I submit further that the question of whether nuclear delivery vehicles and conventional armaments will be reduced by 30 per cent or 100 per cent, or some other percentage, in the first stage is a substantive and not a drafting problem. I submit that the working out of the necessary measures to verify the elimination of nuclear weapons is a substantive and not a drafting problem. I submit that the question of how we are to provide for inspection or verification is a substantive and not a drafting problem. The questions of how the international disarmament organization will be governed, how the peace force will be staffed, and how the United Nations peace-keeping capabilities are to be strengthened, are substantive questions and not mere drafting problems.

Therefore, despite the wish of the representative of Czechoslovakia that we should accept the Soviet draft treaty as our basis of work, we believe that the members of the Committee will understand and support the procedure of work outlined by Mr. Rusk on 27 March, a procedure which I followed in my statement yesterday.

When we agree, as I am sure we shall, that the production of fissionable materials for weapon use should be included in the first stage of our programme, we can establish a drafting sub-committee to recommend the specific treaty provisions for putting this part of the programme into effect. When we agree on the precise nature of the control mechanisms which would be required to verify, for example, that 50,000 kilograms - or whatever figure which the Soviet Union may wish to suggest and upon which we may agree - had been removed from the nuclear weapons material stockpiles, we can translate this directly into appropriate treaty language.

The approach that we propose would not, as has been suggested, involve the Committee in useless debate. Rather, it would seem to me that it would avoid useless debate on texts before we had agreed upon the substance. The procedure that we suggest concentrates on four major areas that are central and common to

(Mr. Dean, United States)

the programmes that have been presented and to the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles. The procedure that we have suggested avoids any considerations of prestige or priority, or any negotiating advantage for any programme that any delegation may wish to submit. Indeed, it is based on the approach which the representative of India, Mr. Krishna Menon, referred to as the development of a "master key", that is, a treaty outline or programme which is the product of the Conference as a whole.

We do not wish to divert attention from the substance of disarmament by encouraging any prolonged discussion of the agenda. We are suggesting no rigid agenda, but merely an approach with sufficient focus to guide us in our discussion and with sufficient flexibility to enable us to deal with all aspects of the respective areas that the Conference deems it necessary to consider. The United States delegation believes that this approach is the most realistic, productive and efficient one that we can follow. This approach would give us the total framework which would serve as a skeleton for our treaty or treaties to put general and complete disarmament into effect. To do otherwise, we submit, would be to put the cart before the horse.

We must not get bogged down in the drafting of treaty language in areas of somewhat subsidiary importance without having first agreed upon the substance. We must first have an overall view of how we are to go about accomplishing our objective of general and complete disarmament - what measures will go into each stage, how long it will take to carry these measures out, and precisely how each measure will be verified.

I hope that these brief remarks will indicate to the representative of Czechoslovakia that my delegation is following a carefully thought out and, I hope, a most constructive procedure for the work of this Committee, and that the procedure we have proposed is the most efficient and, indeed, the most effective way of making progress in this Conference.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I think the Conference made important and encouraging progress at the last meeting, when it considered the preamble to our agreement. Many delegations, including the Italian delegation, made concrete proposals for the final drafting of the text. I hope that the Co-Chairmen will be able to consider them quickly, so that we may soon have a joint text approved by us all.



(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Today we have heard the clear and detailed explanations given us by Mr. Zorin concerning article 1 of the Soviet draft treaty. I followed him with the closest attention, and I intend to study the record most thoroughly. But now that we have begun drafting the preamble, it seems to me that an important question arises regarding our future method of work. We have, so to speak, to construct a treaty or treaties on general and complete disarmament. In order to proceed quickly, as we all wish, we must have an overall view of our task. We must agree on how the treaty or treaties are to be composed and visualize the framework of these treaties or agreements.

I certainly do not wish to reopen the general debate which has already taken place with the participation of our Foreign Ministers, but rather to go deeper, to enter into the real substance of the subject. This we can do, and we can really make progress if we now agree on a general plan of work and on the broad lines of the agreements or treaties we are to sign at the end of this Conference.

Consequently, I doubt whether the best method now would be to examine article by article the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet delegation, side by side with the proposals submitted by the United States delegation. Those texts form the basis of our work, but if we were to proceed in that way, I fear we should come up against serious difficulties immediately.

Mr. Dean referred to the building of a house; and indeed, it is not by placing one brick on another that one builds a house, but by drawing up a plan beforehand, by making a sketch of the house, a drawing showing what it will consist of when it is finished. It is only then that we can begin to dig the foundations and lay the first stones.

I have just said that we should come up against serious difficulties. If, indeed, we were to take up the first line of article 1 of the Soviet draft treaty now, a major difficulty would immediately arise. That article provides that general and complete disarmament shall be carried out in four years. The Soviet delegation knows that there are objections to that proposal on the part of certain delegations, including the Italian delegation. Those of us who took part in the work of the Ten Nation Committee will no doubt remember that the discussion on time-limits occupied that Committee for three months.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

This time, the situation is much more favourable, and I hope we shall be able to reach agreement even on the time-limits; nevertheless, I am fully aware of the difficulties we shall have to overcome.

For all these reasons, I consider that the Conference, instead of beginning immediately to examine the articles containing points on which agreement can only be reached later, should proceed to consider the general lines of the agreement we are to sign - the pillars, so to speak, of the edifice to be built. That will enable us to save time and press on with our work in a really constructive manner.

Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): Taking part in the discussion on article 1 of the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, which contains general provisions concerning the obligations of the parties in the matter of disarmament, the Polish delegation considers that the text of article 1 of the Soviet draft provides the most detailed and complete presentation of disarmament obligations.

At the same time, we share the view that there is some similarity between the provisions of the Soviet draft and those of the United States programme of 25 September 1961.

This fact facilitates - should facilitate - our task of quickly drawing up an agreed text of the article. But I must express my regret that Mr. Dean, the United States representative, did not think it possible to take up immediately - here and now - the discussion on article 1 of the draft treaty. I hope that as he promised, the United States delegation will be ready to do so very soon, so that we can make progress in our work. I should like to believe so, although I find the United States representative's remarks rather disquieting. In my view the constant return to procedural problems is unjustified and even difficult to understand; especially as we have already all adopted our working procedure and agreed - here I quote the document on procedure adopted at the 8th meeting of the Conference - to "... consider the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament of March 15, 1962, the United States programme for general and complete disarmament of September 25, 1961, and other proposals which have been or may subsequently be made ...". (ENDC/12)

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

At the same time, the United States representative has again spoken today, as he did yesterday, of a number of substantive problems dealt with in the provisions of the documents before us, such as the question of delivery vehicles, the question of prohibiting the manufacture of fissionable materials and other questions which should, for reasons of logic and procedure, be considered at later stages.

The representative of Italy told us just now that he did not wish to reopen the general debate; but I must say that in fact his suggestions tend in that direction. Again, the analogy with the building of a house may be interesting, but mainly for the builder; treaty-drafting methods have their traditions and I fear that if we were to heed the representative of Italy we should not build the house which we have been commissioned to build.

Turning to article 1 of the treaty, I should like to emphasize that the scope of the obligations placed on States throughout the process of general and complete disarmament has been determined similarly in the Soviet draft and in the US programme. It follows from the disarmament principles agreed last September between the Soviet Union and the United States that the Soviet and US documents determine in a similar manner disarmament obligations of States such as the total elimination and prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and the vehicles for their delivery, and the liquidation of armed forces and conventional armaments.

We must not, of course, conceal the fact that if we speak of conformity of the preliminary articles of both drafts, that does not mean conformity of content of the articles relating to the substance of implementation of the agreed principles for disarmament. It seems to us, however, that the adoption of these preliminary articles, the adoption of the common aims and the principles of general disarmament, will later facilitate our endeavours to bring the positions on points of substance closer together.

The conformity of opinions on two important problems is of particular significance, however. In the first place, both the Soviet draft, in article 1, paragraph 4, and the United States draft, in the sixth paragraph of the preamble, sub-paragraph (c), propose that disarmament should be carried out in a balanced manner, without endangering the security of the different States. It should here be pointed out, however, that the Soviet draft better expresses the idea contained in paragraph 5 of the principles agreed by the Soviet Union and the United States, the US plan being drafted on somewhat general lines.

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

In the second place, both documents stress that the transition to each succeeding stage of disarmament must be preceded, first, by verification by the International Disarmament Organization that the disarmament measures laid down for the previous stage have been carried out and, secondly, by preparation of all the verification measures necessary for the next stage.

We consider that the rapprochement of the positions of the two parties regarding the problems I have mentioned constitutes a definite step forward in the disarmament negotiations, for - as will be remembered - it was, precisely, a difference of opinion on those problems that constituted one of the main difficulties in the past.

There are also differences between the articles we are now discussing. One of them is the question of dismantling bases on foreign territory. In article 1, the Soviet draft expressly proposes the dismantling of foreign military bases. The American programme, on the other hand, ignores this question. The problem of foreign military bases is of great significance, particularly in Europe. Apart from the fact that such bases constitute a threat to the security of the States along whose frontiers they are situated, the maintenance in peace-time of foreign military bases specially equipped with weapons of mass destruction on the territory of many countries is an abnormal phenomenon, which cannot be reconciled with the principle that relations between States should be lasting, peaceful and consistent with sovereignty.

In drawing attention to one of the controversial problems, we hope that means of overcoming the difficulties will be found and that these problems will not be an obstacle to deciding on the content of article 1. It should be understood that if we succeed in drafting this article, such a step forward, although it still does not imply agreement on the substantive clauses, will undoubtedly be welcomed with great satisfaction by public opinion throughout the world.

Mr. de MELLO-FRANCO (Brazil) (translation from French): I have listened with the greatest attention to the various statements made this morning. I have considered particularly the restatements of position made by Mr. Zorin for the Soviet Union and by Mr. Dean for the United States. From what Mr. Zorin said, I take it that he considers the procedure for drawing up the preamble to the future

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treaty on general and complete disarmament to be agreed. He regards as satisfactory the procedure established at the last meeting, namely, that the two co-Chairmen agree to consider the suggestions and amendments which are to be made by next Monday at the latest, so that the Committee can begin to examine the draft by Tuesday. Mr. Zorin then went on to consider forthwith, point by point, article 1 of the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Mr. Dean, on the other hand, maintained the position taken by Mr. Rusk, the United States Secretary of State, on how the treaty on general and complete disarmament should be drawn up. There is no denying that Mr. Dean was clearly opposed to the method proposed and adopted by Mr. Zorin, of examining, line by line, the drafts submitted to the Committee for consideration.

In the situation we are in, it would be idle to deny that we have more or less arrived at an impasse, because the decisions which must be taken in the Committee are not of a kind that should be adopted by a majority vote; they are decisions which, in my view and in the opinion of my delegation, depend on acceptance by the two co-Chairmen. Consequently, if there is such an appreciable and wide disagreement, it relates to the method and not to the procedure. The Committee must first of all study this disagreement before attempting to resolve it. Basically, there is a difference between method and procedure. Procedure is a matter of circumstances, whereas method is a way of working which takes account of deeper considerations.

Considering the question from the point of view of method, I note that we found it very easy to agree on the general questions dealt with in the preamble. We all observed that the disagreements which arose during the discussion of the preamble concerned its form. Fortunately there were no serious differences of opinion on the substance. And that is quite understandable, because there is no substantial disagreement on the aim of our Committee, which is carrying out a mandate from the United Nations. We are all agreed in recognizing the immediate need to solve the problem of disarmament and its importance for international life.

It is always very easy to agree on generalities, however. Here I would like to recall the famous reply made to Diderot by the Empress Catherine of Russia concerning the letter she had received from the French philosopher giving her advice on establishing justice and equity in her realm. The reply of the Russian Empress was that the generalities in the letter were very easy to understand and

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to follow, but that as to the specific points there would always be difficulties and obstacles. It is, precisely, on the specific points that it is difficult to reach an agreement, whether national or international, in the political struggle.

Here we are doing the opposite of what is generally done in examining philosophical problems. We are proceeding from the general to the particular, whereas the most rational method is obviously to proceed from the particular to the general.

As we have progressed with relative ease so far -- an ease which is bound to give rise to some optimism on the part of world opinion in view of the chances of our work being successful -- I fear we may be held up by very grave difficulties which were not foreseen because we did not have to consider them, but which are sure to arise when we come to examine the concrete problems. The important statements made this morning by the representatives of Italy and Poland showed us that there are already difficulties of this kind connected with the time required for carrying out general and complete disarmament.

Like many of our distinguished colleagues, I had the honour to represent my country at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, and the direction taken by the discussion makes me fear that we may soon find ourselves in an atmosphere which so far has been avoided in the work at Geneva, namely, the atmosphere of the cold war. I can speak quite freely on this matter. I do not represent a country committed to one of the two blocs carrying on what is called the cold war, and the duty of my country -- as of all those which, for the same reason, have been called to meet here, because they are countries more or less remote from the atmosphere of the cold war -- is to express the fear that we may see an atmosphere of tragedy created here, which would prevent any favourable developments in our work.

In his very important statement, Mr. Zorin took the view that the procedure adopted for drawing up the preamble had been accepted. But what is that procedure? It is, to be perfectly precise, the mandate given by the Conference to the two co-Chairmen to agree on a joint draft of the preamble based on the existing texts and the amendments put forward by the various delegations. I may be mistaken, but I do not see any great difference between that method of work and the method which should be applied in considering the rest of the treaty on

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general and complete disarmament. Just as we have agreed that the preamble should be dealt with by this procedure, we could perfectly well agree that the rest of the treaty, the problem of the methodological impasse we have reached, the problem of how to approach questions -- that is to say the idea of examining existing texts line by line, and the idea of agreement on particular points which need to be considered in drawing up the final text -- that all these matters be left to the two co-Chairmen of our Conference to decide.

My reason for saying this is that I fear that otherwise we shall not attain any of the objectives set forth here. Since the Soviet draft is clearly the most extensive, the broadest and the most complete, there is no doubt that we should always work on this draft, despite the need to reach agreement on particular points. But it is equally clear that for such agreement it would be necessary to examine the preliminary questions which Mr. Dean put so well here -- and I would like to say that his analysis seemed to me very sound -- for how could any of the drafts be examined line by line if agreement had not been reached on other points which, at a given moment, had not yet been examined, but whose settlement was essential for a fully-informed appreciation of the very point under consideration?

I do not intend to ask the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States directly to accept the suggestion -- for it is not yet a proposal -- which I have just made, namely, that for the examination of the rest of the treaty on general and complete disarmament the same procedure be adopted as was adopted yesterday for drawing up the preamble to that treaty, that is to say that the two co-Chairmen seek to reach agreement on a suggestion for getting out of the impasse we now appear to have reached. I should like, first, to know whether the two co-Chairmen and the other delegations regard my suggestion favourably. If so, I will make it a formal proposal to the Conference. But if, unfortunately, no agreement can be reached on this matter between the representatives of the two most important Powers taking part in this Conference, the only thing left for me to do will be, while regretting the disagreement, to wait patiently, but with hope, for a solution to be reached.

Mr. HASSAN (United Arab Republic): The statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union concerning article 1 of the Soviet draft treaty and the remarks made by the representative of the United States on the United States approach to this matter will be carefully considered by my delegation. We trust that the co-Chairmen will explore, and reach agreement on, a common approach to the procedure to be followed by us in considering the substance of the two drafts in a productive and expeditious manner.

I would like to make another point in connexion with our discussion yesterday. I gathered from the remarks made by both the representative of the United Kingdom and the representative of the USSR during our discussion at the last meeting about an international peace force that the draft of the preamble before us was in fact a "first reading" and not the final draft. As I see it, this common understanding might enable us to reduce discussion of this issue to a minimum. It is almost certain that at this stage it is hardly possible to decide what is really necessary in the preamble and what is not. It is obvious that what might seem worth mentioning now might at a later stage prove to be unnecessary. I therefore appeal to the two co-Chairmen to reconsider the draft of the preamble and the points of view expressed today in the light of this common understanding.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): The Romanian delegation notes that it is only one week since, on the proposal of the co-Chairmen, we decided on the procedure of work for our Committee, and yet our discussion is again being diverted to questions of procedure. Document ENDC/12 of 23 March gives sufficient indication of the procedure we should observe. This document proceeds from our main task of reaching an agreement on general and complete disarmament. It therefore provides for our examination of the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2) of 15 March, the United States draft programme (ENDC/6) submitted by President Kennedy to the General Assembly of United Nations on 25 September 1961, and other proposals relating to this matter. Naturally, our Committee began at the beginning - that is, with consideration of the preamble to the Soviet draft treaty. Delegations praised it or criticized it, and proposed additional provisions. Eventually a time-limit was fixed - Monday, 2 April - for the written communication of observations on the preamble, and the two co-Chairmen were asked to work out jointly a draft preamble for submission to the Committee.



(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

It naturally follows that we should now get down to a consideration of article 1 of the Soviet draft and all other texts bearing on that article which have been tabled. At this point, however, we are told that we should abandon this simple, normal and efficient procedure and adopt another one. This seems to involve a risk of dividing our efforts and attention and complicating our work by setting up a number of sub-committees, the activities of which it would be very difficult, and very soon even impossible, to follow, let alone co-ordinate.

On the contrary, by continuing with the procedure endorsed by our Committee, that is to say, to examine the documents before us article by article, our work can be more efficiently controlled. These are a number of ideas to demonstrate that there may be drawbacks to altering the agreed procedure after it has been successfully applied for the past seven days. We cannot help recalling here the wise French proverb: "Le mieux est l'ennemi du bien". There are numerous problems of substance awaiting us: let us concentrate on them; let us consider them one by one. This will be the best guarantee that all the problems which seem so much to concern those who are suggesting procedural changes, will be examined in time.

The Italian representative asked that we first draw up the plan of the building and then proceed to erect it. It is quite logical to proceed in that way. Nobody would first build the house and afterwards draw up the blueprints. However, that is not the situation which confronts us. We have before us a draft plan of the building we are about to erect - the Soviet draft treaty of 15 March 1962 and the United States programme presented by President Kennedy on 25 September 1961. Article 1 of the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament gives a clear definition of general and complete disarmament and the draft treaty sets out the stages necessary to erect the building.

At this stage of our debate the Romanian delegation wishes to express the hope that our Committee will reach complete agreement on the procedural questions so that our time may be dedicated entirely to our principal task, that of drawing up a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

I should now like to say a few words in regard to article 1 of the Soviet draft treaty. This article defines the obligations to be assumed by signatory States on the four following issues: the content of general and complete disarmament; the nature, structure and equipment of the police or military forces

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necessary to internal security and the maintenance of peace in the world without weapons; the succession of the stages of disarmament and the conditions for passing from one stage to another; and, finally, the assurance of the equal security of States in the disarmament process.

At this stage of our debate the Romanian delegation does not intend to refer to each of these problems. We would like to define our stand with regard to the first and most important of them, namely, the content of disarmament. According to the joint United States-USSR statement of 20 September 1961, general and complete disarmament should ensure:

"(a) disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military establishments, including bases, cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses; (b) elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons; (c) elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction; (d) abolishment of the organization and institutions designed to organize the military effort of States, cessation of military training, and closing of all military training institutions; (e) discontinuance of military expenditures" (ENDC/5, page 2).

We have thus a sure, indisputable and unanimously-accepted criterion for a proper appreciation of the content of general and complete disarmament.

Studying the provisions of article 1, paragraph 1 of the Soviet draft treaty and comparing them with the above-quoted provisions of the joint statement, we note that they fully correspond. Although the text of article 1 of the Soviet draft treaty is before each delegation, we deem it necessary to recall that that article defines general and complete disarmament as follows:

"The disbanding of all armed forces and the prohibition of their re-establishment in any form whatsoever;

"The prohibition, and destruction of all stockpiles, and the cessation of the production of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, including atomic, hydrogen, chemical, biological and radiological weapons;

"The destruction and cessation of the production of all means of delivering weapons of mass destruction to their targets;

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"The dismantling of all kinds of foreign military bases, and the withdrawal and disbanding of all foreign troops stationed in the territory of any State;

"The abolition of any kind of military conscription for citizens;

"The cessation of military training of the population and the closing of all military training institutions;

"The abolition of war ministries, of general staffs and their local agencies, and of all other military and para-military establishments and organizations;

"The elimination of all types of conventional armaments and military equipment, and the cessation of their production, except for the production of strictly limited amounts of agreed types of light firearms for the equipment of the police (militia) contingents to be retained by States after the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament;

"The discontinuance of the appropriation of funds for military purposes, whether from State budgets or from organizations or private individuals." (ENDC/2, page 2)

There is no element in the content of disarmament as specified in the Joint Statement that is not to be found in the clear formulation of the article I have referred to. We are thus presented with a full picture of what general and complete disarmament represents. Governments and peoples find in the above-mentioned provisions a comprehensive answer to the question: what are the obligations we must assume? A characteristic feature of this conception of disarmament is that it envisages radical measures and not half measures.

For the reasons we have just mentioned, the Romanian delegation fully agrees with article 1 of the Soviet draft treaty.

We have also studied the United States proposals of 25 September 1961. This has permitted us to note that all the provisions of the United States document which are in accordance with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles are included in article 1 of the Soviet draft. I would also mention that as regards the other problems dealt with in article 1, the Soviet draft treaty takes into account the point of view expressed in the United States programme. The fact that the provisions of article 1 fully correspond to the joint United States-Soviet statement, which was endorsed by the United Nations, opens up the perspective that that article can be readily accepted by the Conference.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I would like to make a few comments arising out of the discussion we have had this morning. It has been an interesting discussion but, as the representative of Brazil has so well put it, out of it have emerged certain differences of opinion, which he defined as being differences as to method rather than as to procedure. I agree with him that we have got to define quite clearly how we are going to proceed at the present stage of our discussions.

The representative of the Soviet Union has introduced article 1 of the Soviet draft treaty and has gone through it in detail, and some other representatives have followed this line. Still others have said that there are matters that we should discuss and clear up first. I do think we have got to remember that in any formulation of articles of a treaty the very formulation of the article is the recording of agreement on a particular matter, and until the necessary degree of agreement has been established it is impossible to record that agreement. Therefore it is necessary for us, following from that, to be quite clear in our minds about certain matters before we get involved too closely in the detailed wording of the articles of the treaty. In saying this I do not in any way wish to criticize the production of a draft by one delegation or another: indeed I think it is very helpful, and I am very glad that the Soviet Union has brought forward its draft. It can in many ways help to draw together the discussion in regard to certain matters.

However, I think it is important that we should consider certain basic matters, and, of course, this particular article to which the leader of the Soviet delegation has drawn our attention today is extraordinarily broad in its concept; indeed it is a summary of a great many of the matters which we have to discuss. Of course - and I am quite sure Mr. Zorin himself would be the first to agree - this does not in any way preclude discussion of other matters. I notice that Mr. Gromyko, when he spoke at our tenth meeting and referred to the Soviet draft treaty, said:

"It should be understood that what I have said does not at all mean that insufficient attention will be given to the proposals of other

delegations regarding general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/PV.10, page 17)

I think it is significant that he used the word "proposals" - in other words, not merely written memoranda but any suggestions put forward by any delegation. I am sure we would all agree that that is right.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

In the same sense, I think one should consider some of the proposals which Mr. Rusk put before us on the same day (ENDC/PV.10, page 13). He gave us four particular areas for discussion which he thought it was important to get clarified in our minds. He referred to measures for the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons and measures for the elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction. He went on to mention the reduction and elimination of all armed forces, conventional armaments, military expenditures - much as they are set out in the article in the Soviet draft treaty. He also referred to measures for the creation of an international disarmament organization - again, referred to in the Soviet article - and to measures to strengthen institutions for the maintenance of peace. These, I think, are all subjects of prime importance, which occupy a very important position in regard to our whole discussions.

Mr. Rusk's suggestion at that time was that we should have a general debate in relation to those subjects. I can see real advantage in that, but it is for the Conference to decide how it wishes to handle this. It could be done, of course, in one complete general debate, which, if necessary, could come within the ambit of article 1, because it is so wide in scope. I would not oppose that as a matter of procedure, but when it comes to a matter of method I would say that it would be a confusing way, perhaps, of doing it. However, this is a matter which I think we must consider further, and probably we shall have to ask our long-suffering co-Chairmen to give further thought to it and to advise us in relation to it.

I thought also that on the same occasion Mr. Rusk was giving us very wise advice when he referred to the setting up of sub-committees for certain subjects. I was interested in the statement just made by the representative of Romania. He seemed to be somewhat critical of sub-committees or hesitant as to their value. Certainly we do not want to disperse all of our activities in that way, but I would have thought that there were certain particular subjects where a high degree of expert skill is required and where if we do not set up sub-committees we are going to have a most difficult task indeed in plenary. I would think it would be wise for us to give some further thought to that. So as far as our methods and procedures are concerned I think we have all got to ponder what has been said today and try to find the best way of dealing with these particular matters. In that sense I do commend these subjects to which I have referred.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I would like to take up one more point in relation to procedure, following the remarks of the representative of Romania, who referred to the document dealing with the procedure of work of the Conference, as I understood it. Paragraph 1 of that document clearly envisages, or gives ample scope for, the handling of the matter in any of the ways I indicated a few moments ago.

Perhaps I might make one or two short comments on some of the points which, as I have indicated, I think are of importance in this particular regard and all of which arise out of this particular article.

The whole question of the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons - and I think it is important to recall this - occupies a different position in relation to the plans of the Soviet Union and the United States. In the United States plan it is provided for right at the beginning: in the Soviet plan it comes in stage II. This is something I think we have to discuss; we have to consider where it is most fitting to place it. It was in this connexion, of course, that the United States made the dramatic proposal of transferring 50,000 kilograms of fissile material to peaceful uses. I hope that can be taken up and discussed and that we can reach agreement on some figure in regard to giving up fissile material on both sides. This, again, could be considered in a sub-committee in the Committee of the Whole. But it is on these practical matters that we want to try and make progress.

I also think, and this was mentioned by Mr. Dean yesterday, that a committee of nuclear experts of the nuclear Powers should get together in order to make a joint study of how best to verify the elimination of stockpiles of these nuclear weapons. In the earlier versions of the Soviet plan and in their basic provisions of September 1960, the Soviet Government did envisage similar studies, but so far as I can see there is no such reference in the present Soviet plan. I presume that this does not mean any change of view in regard to the matter; possibly they felt it was unsuitable to include this reference in their draft. But this is a matter which can be cleared up. If we were to appoint a committee of experts on this, I think it would be useful.

I did comment briefly on this point yesterday, but I think it is worth while to pursue it further because, in itself, this particular offer of the deposit of fissile material of this order of magnitude would be a tremendous step in the direction in which we are all seeking to move. If the two greatest nuclear

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Powers were able to provide this particular amount, or some other amount which might be agreed, obviously the world stocks of these materials would be very substantially reduced. It is these fissile materials which are the basis of so much of the armament that is a source of grave concern to us all at the present time. This is one area in which I think we could proceed, and it is one of the four items which were mentioned by Mr. Rusk.

I would just say another word about the allied question of the elimination of the delivery vehicles of these particular weapons. This, I really think, is going to be one of our most difficult problems. It is one of the most essential problems, but it is also one of the most difficult because there is at the present time a fairly wide divergence. It is a divergence only on timing, on the stage in which progress would have to be made. On this particular point, Mr. Rusk said on Tuesday of this week that the divergence is purely one of timing; but it is one that has to be overcome because on this greatly depends our ability fully to comply with the fifth of the Agreed Principles, to which reference has already been made by a number of people in this Committee. It is a question of tying in precisely the timing of the reduction of these delivery vehicles which is so necessary if we are to comply adequately with that fifth principle.

The United States plan, as I am sure all representatives are aware, does provide for a reduction of 30 per cent in the first stage, whereas the Soviet plan provides for a reduction of 100 per cent during that period. We have to look at this together, and we have to try and get an agreed solution. But I am sure that on reflection our Soviet colleagues will agree that the attempt to eliminate these particular delivery vehicles in the first stage must reach principle 5, which is such an important matter. I think this is a matter on which we have to have further discussion. I think it might be fruitful if we did have a debate here in plenary specifically concerned with this problem, because it arises in this particular article and will arise far more precisely in other articles we shall consider, no matter what basis we use - the Soviet draft, the United States draft, or any other draft - and this point has to be cleared up.

Then I would just say a word about the international disarmament organization. We have had some encouraging comments in relation to that, and I think there is general agreement that this is going to be a most important body and is going to

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require very careful consideration, both as to its setting up and its staffing and as to the rules of procedure it will have to follow. At a fairly early stage in our discussions we have got to proceed to the formulation of the basis on which this body has to be set up, because on the functioning of the international disarmament organization will rest a great deal of the feeling of security of States when their own national forces are being reduced.

In the same way, the question of a peace force is, I think, one of primary importance at the later stages. I will not say this is absolutely essential in the early stages of disarmament; I do not think it is. But I do think that as the degree of elimination of national arms increases, so the degree of reliance upon an international peace force must also increase. Therefore, I must admit to representatives that I was a little discouraged yesterday at the response of the leader of the Soviet delegation to my comments in regard to the preamble. Certainly, whether or not it is plainly spelt out in the preamble, it is not a matter of the most tremendous importance, but what is of tremendous importance is that all States, as they eliminate their arms, shall have an increasing degree of confidence in the ability of an international peace force to help them in case of need. This, I think, is an essential part of the confidence-building measures on which we will all, particularly at the later stages of the disarmament process, have to rely very much. I was not altogether happy, again, with the comments Mr. Zorin made on this particular point this morning. I am not sure whether there is a point of substantive disagreement between my own views and those of the Soviet delegation on this, but I shall listen most carefully to their further comments in relation to it.

As I understood Mr. Zorin both yesterday and today, he envisaged that these forces would be maintained solely on the territory of the country that provided them. I am not sure that this would be a wholly satisfactory basis, but this again is a matter which I am perfectly willing to see discussed, elaborated and ironed out between us. Again, it is a subject which could form the basis of a debate in itself, and I refer to it here only as one of those aspects to which we have to give further thought.



(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I would just make one or two brief comments on the speech of Mr. Zorin this morning in regard to one or two particular points he mentioned when he went through the article. These are only preliminary comments. My own view is that, whatever method we adopt in regard to our further discussion, this particular article would certainly not be one which we could finalize in any way until we had finalized a number of the articles on which it is dependent, because it is a summary, in fact, of what is to be done under other articles. Therefore, whatever method we adopt, I think it would be quite impossible for us finally to put our stamp of agreement on an article of this general nature until we had got a great deal further with our drafting of other articles.

Nevertheless, there are one or two points to which I would like to refer. In particular, I would refer to what Mr. Zorin said in relation to the paragraph relating to the disbanding of all kinds of foreign military bases. He went to some trouble to spell this out and to explain to us just why he had included the word "foreign" here. Then, having spelt it out, he said at the end of his remarks:

"National bases in national territory will, of course, be dismantled in accordance with the provision for the disbanding of all national armed forces, which I have previously explained. When such disbanding has been carried out, military camps, barracks and bases will of course disappear. This is so obvious that it hardly requires any further explanation."

(Supra, page 9).

These are Mr. Zorin's words, and I think there is a great deal of sense in them. But these words in relation to national bases are equally applicable to foreign bases, because as we dismantle, reduce and abolish bases at home, obviously they will be abolished abroad at the same time, if not earlier.

Therefore, concentration in this particular sentence of this article on the word "foreign" seems to me to be wholly inappropriate, because these bases would automatically be disbanded at the same time as all others. If it is desired to include a reference to foreign bases, then it would be necessary at the same time to include a reference to national bases. Otherwise, a special degree of significance would arise from referring to the one and not to the other. I would hope that when this question is considered Mr. Zorin, if he will forgive me for saying so, will give more convincing arguments than those which he gave us this morning if he wishes to retain the position that he has set out.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I was also very much in agreement with Mr. Dean's reference to the fact that paragraph 2 of article 1 of the Soviet draft mentions article 37 of the draft. I have already touched on the question of the peace force, and I do not wish to go into it any further at this time. I would only say, with respect to the question of drafting that this is the only reference to a specific article, as I see it, in article 1. I believe that it is not advisable in a summary article appearing at the beginning of a text to refer to any article specifically by number. I think that the position should be spelt out. The same applies to paragraph 3, where there is a reference to the international disarmament organization, the first reference one finds in the document. Admittedly it is spelt out in article 2, but if the international disarmament organization is to be referred to in article 1, then it must be referred to more specifically so that one does not have to be jumping forward to further points.

These are merely matters which I point out to the Committee not in any critical sense, but because I should like us, when we come to the drafting of these points, to provide the most straightforward and the simplest language, language which would be most helpful to us all in considering these very complicated matters. That is all that I wish to say on this point at the present time.

However, I would like to go back to the question of procedure and say that I hope we shall find a way in which we can have some further discussion along the lines I have indicated, and I hope we shall give some further thought to having sub-committees, where appropriate, particularly where there is a necessity for consulting experts on certain matters. Otherwise, I can see that if we work here in plenary meetings we shall be working very long hours indeed on very abstruse matters where perhaps help from others in a smaller body might facilitate our progress. What we all want to do is to proceed further and faster in the actual work. What we are all not quite certain about at the moment is just how we are going to achieve that. If we can give some further thought to the comments that have been made this morning and if the co-Chairmen can have some further discussion, it may facilitate matters.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): As some of the previous speakers have pointed out, we did some very good work yesterday. We were able, so to speak, to conclude a part of our discussion on the preamble to the treaty, and we asked the co-Chairmen to undertake the drafting of the first article of the draft treaty to be drawn up here on general and complete disarmament.

I do not think it was only because a lady presided over our meeting that we did good work yesterday, but also because there was a good understanding between the delegations.

Today we ran into a difficulty at the very beginning of the discussion. While the Committee was preparing to follow the method of work which had already been adopted for the first part, it was proposed that we should reconsider the method of work of the Eighteen Nation Committee. Some speakers even referred to an impasse. I do not think we have reached an impasse. The Conference has already decided on a procedure recommended by the co-Chairmen for the work of the Eighteen Nation Committee. It can therefore be said that we have already adopted our procedure, which enables us to get out of a situation like that in which we should certainly be placed if we followed the proposals which have just been made.

If there is a desire to change the procedure, that is another matter. But a procedure has already been adopted; it has already been quoted, but I will quote it again to make it quite clear, although some speakers said that it would certainly permit of digressions here and there to discuss methods of work. The procedure is as follows:

"The Committee will consider the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament of March 15, 1962, the United States programme for general and complete disarmament of September 25, 1961, and other proposals which have been or may subsequently be made, in the light of the Statement of Agreed Principles of September 20, 1961 and General Assembly Resolution 1722(XVI) of December 20, 1961." (ENDC/12)

I am in agreement with the United Kingdom representative who stressed the words "other proposals". But it is certainly intended to have a procedure which will enable us to consider a treaty, a programme, and the proposals which may subsequently be made. In our opinion that should be clearly understood, since a decision has been taken by the Committee. No doubt the Committee is the master of its own procedure. It can change it; but the fact remains that a procedure has already been adopted.

(Mr. Tarabonov, Bulgaria)

The representative of the United States, however, raised the question whether we should not approach our work in a slightly different way, whether we should not concentrate -- I quote -- "on solving some of those substantive issues and obtaining a framework of the agreement we seek". Other speakers, who spoke on the same lines and supported his remarks, said that we should first plan the framework for our treaty, or draw the plan of the house we wish to build. We must first ask what house we are going to build. The house which we ought to build and which everyone wants us to build is, of course, that of disarmament. How are we going to set about building that house? We are going to draw up a plan: now that plan is precisely what we have to work out here. It is the framework within which we are going to work in order to bring about general and complete disarmament. There is no other possibility; we must have a plan, and I agree with the representatives who said so, but we must know what plan. If we try to start discussing the questions on which we are more or less agreed at the same time as the questions on which there are differences of opinion, we are bound to get involved, as the representative of Czechoslovakia said only yesterday, in a general discussion to provide us again with the framework in which to work.

Before this Conference convened, messages were exchanged between the most eminent persons of our time. In these messages Heads of State were asked to come here to reach agreement on the framework to be adopted and to provide the initial impetus. The answer was: but we have the framework; it is the principles we adopted in New York, on 20 September 1961, and on the basis of which we are working. We have even more; we have various drafts before us.

If we now begin to discuss the points of agreement or disagreement before starting work on a treaty, how are we going to draft that treaty? We might have an interminable discussion without getting anywhere, and not succeed in drawing up a treaty on general and complete disarmament. That is where such a procedure would lead us.

We should certainly discuss the substantive points of agreement and disagreement. But those points lie within a framework which has already been fixed by the agreed principles and which has been put forward as a proposal based on those principles in the Soviet draft treaty. Hence we can deal with all these questions when discussing the various parts of a treaty; and we have the Soviet draft treaty before us.

(Mr. Tarabonov, Bulgaria)

We were also told just now that there were certainly differences of timing for the various measures and that it would therefore be difficult to begin discussions. But what is to prevent us, when considering the first part of the Soviet draft treaty, for example, or of the programme submitted by the United States, from holding the discussion which some delegations consider necessary, at the appropriate place? The United States considers, for instance, that in the first part, the first stage of general and complete disarmament, the production of fissionable materials should be stopped. But what is to prevent them from making that proposal when we are discussing the first part? All the delegations will give their views on the proposals submitted. We shall be able to discuss that point in connexion with the first part, as the United States may perhaps wish; and if we reach agreement, the first part of the draft treaty will in fact comprise the proposals made by delegations.

We have been told that it would be difficult to discuss article 1, paragraph 2 of the Soviet draft because it refers to article 37. Article 37 - or some other article - will deal with the forces available to the United Nations for keeping the peace. But what is to prevent us from referring to another article in article 1, paragraph 2 of the Soviet draft? We need not specify the number; we could simply refer to the article concerning the United Nations Peace Force. It would not even be necessary to mention any particular article; that will certainly be done later. Are we against having a United Nations Force? Certainly not. What will it consist of? We are not going to specify that in article 1, paragraph 2; we shall do it later.

Let us consider the paragraph which the USSR proposes that we should discuss today: article 1, paragraph 1. We are told that difficulties arise. What does this paragraph 1 provide? That the States parties to the present Treaty solemnly undertake to carry out general and complete disarmament over a period of four years. Perhaps another period may be fixed. The United States has spoken of nine years - or rather, it was not actually the United States but the United Kingdom which mentioned the period of nine years. Other countries, such as India, have spoken of a period of four to five years. We could decide on the period, or postpone our decision. It is a controversial matter. But have we any objection to the actual principle of fixing a period? No. So we could say that, within

(Mr. Tarabonov, Bulgaria)

a given period, the States parties to the Treaty solemnly undertake to disband all armed forces and prohibit their re-establishment in any form whatsoever. Are there any objections to that? I do not think there is a peace-loving man in this hall or in the whole world who could oppose the disbanding of armed forces and the prohibition of their re-establishment.

The second point is the prohibition and destruction of all stockpiles, and the cessation of the production of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, including atomic, hydrogen, chemical, biological and radiological weapons. But it is, precisely, on the general principles already laid down in the preliminary agreement, that these proposals are based.

What objections could we have to the third point, which is the destruction of all means of delivering weapons of mass destruction? When we say we are going to destroy those vehicles, we do not say we are going to do it at once. Destruction is the objective which we wish to attain. We merely say that we are going to destroy them. Is anyone against this provision of the draft treaty?

There is also the dismantling of all kinds of foreign military bases. Who is going to oppose the dismantling of all kinds of foreign military bases? Foreign military bases will disappear; and with them, I venture to say, will also disappear foreign intervention in certain countries.

What objections can one have to the abolition of any kind of military conscription for citizens? It is towards such abolition that we are proceeding; there should be no one in this hall who is against it.

I do not wish to quote all the succeeding provisions, for I do not think that any representative sitting here could have any sort of objection to them. To object would be to go against the principles agreed on by the United States and the Soviet Union and unanimously adopted by the United Nations. Subject to any supplementary proposals or amendments which may be submitted by delegations, we can have nothing against these provisions.

Thus we have before us here provisions which have in fact been agreed between the parties and which should, in my opinion, be examined and put into the form desired by the various representatives. I think the co-Chairmen could now begin to do that with this article, as they are doing with the preamble.

(Mr. Tarabonov, Bulgaria)

Nothing in this is controversial. At the most, we may have a few amendments, a few emendations of style or drafting, but nothing that could prevent us from adopting this article as quickly as possible and thus showing world opinion that our Committee has done something effective.

Some people have said: they are trying to make us discuss the Soviet proposal first, but we do not wish to do so. That is not the case. According to the procedure we have already adopted, it is understood that we must examine the Soviet proposal, the programme submitted by the United States, and all the other proposals which have been submitted or may be submitted later. The Soviet draft is the fullest that has been submitted so far. Perhaps a fuller draft will be submitted later. That is another question. It is obvious that if a fuller draft is submitted, a greater number of points will be discussed. But in any case we can take advantage of this Soviet proposal immediately and examine all aspects of disarmament.

Some will say: but there are other points which we should like to discuss in sub-committee because they are very important. I do not think we shall refuse to discuss those points when the time comes and they are placed in the context of the appropriate parts of the draft treaty that has been submitted. The Committee is master of its own procedure and can, if it so desires, decide to appoint a sub-committee to examine particular aspects of any question, perhaps in spite of the opposition of certain delegations which would like to defend indefensible principles and positions. The Committee, I repeat, is master of its own procedure and it can do that; but it should do so when the time comes - when we find it absolutely necessary to have a number of sub-committees. I should be sorry for it myself, because I am sure that the more committees we have, the less progress will be made on disarmament, and the less work we shall be able to do - we shall again reach an impasse on general and complete disarmament. That is why my delegation does not wish the Committee to begin its work by setting up bodies of that kind, which would prevent us from making progress.

Our delegation cannot see why, after a fortnight of general debate on the principles of the various questions which arise, we should now embark on another general discussion concerning problems of substance, which would enable us to air our differences, but would not help us to make any progress. On the contrary,

(Mr. Tarabonov, Bulgaria)

I think that the best way of going forward would be to examine, in accordance with the procedure decided on at the beginning of our work on the proposal of the co-Chairmen, "the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament of March 15, 1962, the United States programme for general and complete disarmament of September 25, 1961, and other proposals which have been or may subsequently be made" (ENDC/12).

That is the best method to follow. Indeed, the proof is that by following it yesterday we achieved our first result. I think we can obtain others to place before world opinion and the United Nations if we continue to follow this procedure, which has in fact enabled us to score our first success.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): In regard to the statement of the United Kingdom representative, I should like to make one point crystal clear. The Romanian delegation is not against sub-committees - after all, we proposed the establishment of sub-committees. But we are not in favour of sub-committees when there is no need for them.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): With great respect to my colleagues from Poland and Romania, I find myself compelled to take some exception to the interpretation given by these two representatives to the agreed programme of work contained in document ENDC/12. I think that what was agreed was that all the proposals on general and complete disarmament before the Committee, including the Soviet draft treaty, the United States programme of 25 September, and any other possible programme or proposals that might be submitted to the Committee should be considered concurrently. But I find no statement in document ENDC/12 that examination of these proposals must proceed on a line by line or article by article basis. On the contrary, it says that we are to consider the Soviet draft treaty, the United States programme, "and other proposals" - in the plural.

What we must deal with is the substance of these proposals. We do not think that this approach need involve us in any difficulty or controversy - which is the last thing we wish to cause. What, in essence, we propose that we should discuss are the major issues in disarmament, rather than to spend our time agreeing on summaries before we know what we wish to summarize, or to try to draft treaty language before we know what we want to draft. In our view, specific treaty language and summaries of specific treaty language should be drafted only as the substantive issues are resolved - which I am sure we can do very readily.



(Mr. Dean, United States)

With great respect to our colleague from Brazil, to whose remarks I listened with great interest, I do not think we are really in an impasse. As I said this morning, I am quite prepared to comment at a very early date, after further study, on the remarks made by our Soviet colleague on his draft of article 1. I am sure that other representatives will also want to comment - I certainly hope they will. I also hope that other representatives will be ready to comment on the points I made yesterday on the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. We believe that we should discuss these important substantive issues the very moment we can reach them.

In the programme of work we have agreed upon we have said we are going to consider all these proposals, and I do not see how it is possible to summarize a particular article before we have had an opportunity of considering the whole document. I am very much afraid that if a summary is discussed before the detailed language has been worked out, some representative, when the detailed language is reached, will suggest that we are debarred from considering this matter in detail because we have already adopted it in principle. The adoption of matters in principle before they have been considered in detail can, I submit, be productive of much dissension and great disagreement, because until these matters have been discussed in detail it may be that all the nuances and all the problems that arise may not occur to delegations when they speak. I strongly urge, therefore, that we follow precisely the language of document ENDC/12 and, as I have said, I shall be prepared to comment on article 1 in detail at a very early date.

Mr. LALL (India): We in the delegation of India are happy to note that today, as in the past, the tone of discussion in this Committee continues to be persuasive rather than didactic. We welcome this continuing fact.

We ourselves are in agreement with much that has been said by various speakers today all around this table.

Like Mr. Dean, we do not believe that the statements heard today indicate that an impasse has been reached on the issues before us. In this connexion I would like to refer to something said by Mr. Godber, who, may I say with respect, made many comments today which merit the closest attention. He said, I believe, that he was not criticizing the Soviet approach; in fact he found it helpful

(Mr. Lall, India)

inasmuch as it assisted us to focus our discussions. Therefore, while he supported the clearing up of certain major matters at the outset, before we reached the drafting of the treaty, he seemed to see some merit in other possible approaches. This view is perhaps not identical with, but is very similar to what Mr. Krishna Menon said in his intervention on 20 March, when, on the subject of our procedure, in suggesting several alternative procedures he said that there was no reason why one method should be exclusive of the other.

What do we now suggest? What we suggest is that taking into account the discussion today, the two co-Chairmen should discuss together the situation reached. I believe Mr. Godber suggested this also. One of the penalties of being not only co-Chairmen of this Conference but what they are in the context of this whole issue facing us is that a major responsibility does fall upon the co-Chairmen. We would hope that, although a weekend is coming upon us, a period which is normally associated with a cessation of work, the co-Chairmen will be willing to discuss this matter together and reach agreement. We do not think there is an impasse. We believe that a procedural way out can be found. It is a question of method, as the representative of Brazil said, and I believe Mr. Godber agreed with him. We would only express the hope that the two co-Chairmen, in attending to this issue of the method of work, will remember, as undoubtedly they will, that document ENDC/12, our basic document on procedure, states that the Conference should pursue without delay its primary objective of reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament.

We would therefore urge the two co-Chairmen to remember that we are to proceed without delay, and, in whatever discussion they have, not to overlook that fact; therefore, even though a weekend is before us, I would urge them to spend it in this noble endeavour.

I should like to mention two or three other points. I hope they will not be taken amiss, because I feel they ought not to be.

Many representatives referred to Mr. Rusk's statement at our tenth meeting, on 27 March. In particular, reference was made to certain broad areas which he suggested the Conference should deal with. I have been looking at his reference to these four areas (ENDC/PV.10, p.13). All of them refer to "measures" - measures for the reduction of this, measures for the elimination of that, measures for the creation of an international disarmament organization, measures to strengthen institutions, and so forth.

(Mr. Lall, India)

Now, with great respect, I would have thought that the article which Mr. Zorin introduced today dealt not with specific measures but with general obligations. Quite frankly, it did not seem to me to be an article tremendously different in its concept from the preamble. It was a pre-measure stage that he introduced. I am fortified in that view by the wording of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, paragraph 3 (ENDC/5, page 2), which sets out under (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) almost precisely what the Soviet Union has included, with certain additions, in its article 1 on disarmament obligations. I would like to say at once that I am not trying to defend the wording of the Soviet article or to accept or comment on it at this stage. We shall have comments to make on it later. In our view some things have been left out which should be there. For example, there is no statement that all research for the development of destructive weapons should be discontinued. That is not contained in the Soviet draft, and if there is to be such an elaboration we would like to see that provision included in it.

But my point at the moment is that this is a general elaboration. Of course, it does include issues which have raised controversy. There is the question of reference to article 37, which is related to article 43 of the Charter of the United Nations; there is reference in paragraph 3 to the international disarmament organization; and at the very outset of paragraph 1 there is reference to a period of four years. All these are controversial matters but, as the representative of the United Arab Republic very correctly said, we are engaged in a first reading; we are not finalizing anything at all at this stage.

I am mentioning all this with reference to article 1 of document ENDC/2 simply to indicate that I think it is a preliminary article and not one which deals with measures. Perhaps we could all agree that we should proceed with these matters at this stage as a first reading, not with any finality, leaving out or putting aside the really controversial issues such as the period of time for our total programme, so as to give the co-Chairmen a little more time to discuss the question of the method of work to be used in dealing with our substantive tasks in terms of document ENDC/12.

(Mr. Lall, India)

We hope that these general remarks will be helpful in keeping our work going in this Conference and in resolving this problem of method of work. We have had the advantage of a few informal talks with other representatives, including those in the co-Chairmen's delegations, and we are convinced that this is not an impasse, that it is perfectly possible for the co-Chairmen, who are no doubt aware not only of the views that have been expressed here but also of certain more detailed views to which they have listened at various times, to find a solution. We certainly feel that a method can be evolved which will take into account the two main positions which have been expressed here today. There is a lot to be said for both points of view, and I am sure they can be merged in one method of work.

Mr. de MELLO-FRANCO (Brazil) (translation from French): I apologize for speaking at such a late hour, and I shall be very brief. I merely wish to emphasize that in my previous statement I actually expressed the hope that the two co-Chairmen would agree to solve the problems of method. That hope was repeated by several other delegations, and, if I am not mistaken, the head of the Bulgarian delegation also mentioned a discussion between the two co-Chairmen, and the representative of India expressed exactly the same desire. I am therefore convinced that we are all in agreement on this point. And when I referred just now to an impasse, I was trying to point out that we have in fact arrived at a cross-roads, and are in danger of reaching an impasse if we take the wrong road. If the two co-Chairmen do not succeed in reaching agreement, we shall be in this impasse. That is the meaning of what I said.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): May I say a few words as representative of the Soviet Union? - though I do not intend to reply to many of the observations made by many other speakers. I think that the discussion we have had today both on the substance of article 1, paragraph 1, of the Soviet draft treaty and on the future method of work of our Committee are of great importance. The ideas expressed here should certainly make us reflect on the future of our work and on how, to borrow an expression used by the Brazilian representative, to ensure that we do not take the wrong road at the cross-roads and reach an impasse. We think it is important for us to think about

(The Chairman, USSR)

this now, because any deadlock hindering solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament, after the General Assembly has twice made it a task of primary importance, would of course not only cause great disappointment to all the peoples and countries of the world but also seriously threaten peace, since the work on which the strengthening of peace primarily depends would not be progressing. I do not wish today to speak on all the questions that have been raised, since it is already getting late. But since it is the last working day of the week and, as the Indian representative has said, you can all - unlike us - have a rest, I venture to ask your attention for some ideas which I fancy you will find useful in our subsequent discussions.

What really were we talking about when we spoke of the methods of work? We have had drafted for us a text on the procedure of work of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee. It has been referred to by many speakers, including Mr. Dean, the United States representative. This procedure of work states clearly that our primary objective is to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament. We must conduct our business so that this primary objective really becomes the foundation of our Committee's work. It seems to me that we should not support anything that might distract us from solving this problem. I think we shall all make every effort to do as quickly as possible everything that will help us to solve this problem.

Further, there is an indication of how this problem is to be solved. We are told that "the Committee will consider" - I repeat those words "will consider" - the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament of 15 March 1962, the United States programme for general and complete disarmament of 25 September 1961, and other proposals which have been or may subsequently be made. What does that mean? It means that we cannot conduct our business by discarding the documents submitted us and considering particular questions put forward at the present time. No; that will not do. We must consider the documents which have already been submitted and which we have all agreed are to be considered. I do not know whether the United States wishes to consider the plan it has submitted, the programme for general and complete disarmament of 25 September. If it does not want to consider that programme, let it say so. We want to consider both our treaty and their programme, and we are considering them.

(The Chairman, USSR)

I think that all representatives are satisfied that in our discussion we have considered not only our own draft treaty but also corresponding articles from the United States draft programme. You cannot reproach us with ignoring the United States programme. Naturally, however, since we are the authors of the treaty, we have paid it closer attention, particularly as it is the only complete and detailed draft treaty. I think that this is quite understandable. We certainly have no objection to the United States paying more attention to its own proposal. True, in all the speeches made by the United States I have not yet noticed that it has considered its own programme in a concrete manner - in other words, that it has considered various parts of this programme in relation, say, to what we have already discussed with United States participation. But this is a matter for the United States. It can consider its own programme as it deems necessary. But we have felt bound to study both the draft treaty and the draft programme. We have done so and will continue to do so. That is fully in keeping with the agreed procedure of work.

Further, the procedure of work speaks of "other proposals" which have been or may subsequently be made. The proposals made are, according to Mr. Rusk's statement, additions to the United States programme or clarifications of it. If that is so, let us consider them in conjunction with the United States programme itself and with those paragraphs of the treaty on general and complete disarmament which deal with these questions. We are not, after all, refusing to consider them, and I was very glad to hear Mr. Dean say today that he intended in the near future to present his ideas on what I had stated by way of clarification of article 1, paragraph 1, of our draft. I find this deeply satisfying. I am also deeply satisfied with the statement of the United Kingdom representative, who has already commented today on this text, and also with the statements of our other colleagues who have submitted their views on this article and on part I as a whole. Mr. Godber in particular has already touched upon articles 2 and 3 of part I.

We do not mind if they are slightly anticipating matters. But we do not think you should saddle us with the discussion of issues which in your opinion are the major issues, but which others do not consider to be of primary importance. I am not against discussing these issues in themselves. The Soviet

(The Chairman, USSR)

delegation has stated and confirms again that it will present its views on all the proposals made by the United States. We do not refuse to do so. It would be quite incorrect to give the impression that we are taking the line of disregarding these proposals in some way, of being unwilling, so to speak, to discuss them.

But since Mr. Rusk himself has said that these proposals form an integral part of the United States programme, it is natural that they should be discussed in connexion with those parts of the programme to which they refer. Therefore, since we are now discussing the general provisions relating to the general scope of the disarmament measures, I think it is obviously premature and inappropriate to discuss separate problems or the question of which measure is to be applied at which stage. We shall get to that quite soon, because the question of stages and what in fact the stages will contain constitutes the next phase of our work. Therefore it seems to me that I can quite agree with the remark the United States representative made today, that under paragraph 1 of the agreed procedure of work we can discuss all the questions raised by the various delegations. I am in complete agreement with this. Let us consider all these questions within the framework of this procedure. We do not refuse to do so.

What then remains in dispute? What is it that gives rise to doubt?

The United Kingdom representative has today propounded in detail and defended the proposition that before we start to examine the drafts that have been submitted to us we must have a preliminary discussion of certain problems which he proceeded to enumerate. The United States representative also spoke of this. He listed the problems - the problem of nuclear disarmament, the problem of creating an international armed force, and so on. At the same time Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber emphasized that this should be done before we discuss the specific documents that have already been submitted for our consideration. It is this word "before" which I cannot understand. Why "before"? And why should we discuss those problems before studying the specific parts of the documents in which they are stated? I am afraid that if we proceed like that we shall revert to the stage of disarmament negotiations which I believe existed ten years ago. As those who took part in those negotiations will remember, ten years ago we indeed discussed the problem of nuclear disarmament separately. Then we discussed the problem of disarmament in regard to conventional armaments. Then we discussed separately the problem of control, and so on.

(The Chairman, USSR)

But, gentlemen, you all remember how this ended. We could not agree on a single one of these problems. Why? Apart, of course, from the absence of a desire and will to solve this problem on the part of the States concerned, which is the main consideration, there was also another reason. The nuclear disarmament problem cannot be solved in isolation. It must be settled together with the problem of conventional weapons. You cannot settle the problem of conventional armaments in isolation from the problem of nuclear disarmament. And we were not the only ones to say this; the Western Powers told us this too. When we proposed a reduction of 30 per cent in conventional armed forces, they told us that that could not be settled and asked: "But what about nuclear arms?" When we proposed that we should settle the problem of nuclear arms, they then asked us: "What about your powerful conventional armed forces?" Much of this, of course, was artificial, but some of it was reasonable in the sense that these problems cannot be solved separately in isolation.

This is how the question of a plan for general and complete disarmament arose, in which all these problems are linked and will be settled stage by stage, each linked to the other at each stage. This is the only approach which is now feasible. This is how the plans for general and complete disarmament arose. Two resolutions on this question were adopted in the General Assembly of the United Nations and as a result of all the discussions we fortunately reached the only correct decision, namely, to draft an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

The Soviet Union has made the greatest efforts to put this problem on a practical footing, to express it in completely concrete terms. To begin with, we worked out the fundamental principles of general and complete disarmament; then we worked out the fundamental provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament; and now we have put forward a detailed draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. Yet when we put forward the fundamental principles, the Western Powers did not wish to discuss even those. Surely the members of the Ten Nation Committee, which met in this very same conference chamber, will remember that we proposed a draft of the fundamental principles of general and complete disarmament in May 1960 (TNCD/4). The Western representatives did not accept our principles, and we could not agree on those general principles although



(The Chairman, USSR)

we already had the fundamental provisions of a treaty before us. But when we saw that agreement could not be reached on the fundamental provisions of a treaty, at any rate we proposed the fundamental principles. It proved impossible to come to terms even on these.

After that a long time passed - 1960, nearly the whole of 1961 - and by the end of 1961 we at last managed to agree on fundamental principles. This is an important step forward. This makes it easier for us to solve the problems of disarmament. But how does it affect our work here? It means that on the fundamental principles, on the outline, as it were, of the treaty, we have already reached agreement. But the representative of Italy proposes that we should discuss this outline again. The representative of the United Kingdom and the representative of the United States also tell us that we should start with an outline, with a general framework, etc., etc. But surely we already have the general framework. We have the fundamental principles of general and complete disarmament. These list the fundamental content of general and complete disarmament, and also certain fundamental principles for constructing a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The general outline already exists. More than that, there is already a draft blueprint. There is a draft treaty. There is the programme of general and complete disarmament proposed by the United States, which can also serve as some kind of draft blueprint. Why, then, should we go back now - back to a stage we have already passed - and discuss general principles again? That would clearly be a quite pointless job. Surely we must go forward, not back, and it is possible for us to go forward. Why then should we go back?

And finally, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom propose that we should discuss particular problems. They regard these problems as the major issues and consider that they should be discussed before we take up the specific documents which are before us. But why do you think, gentlemen, that everyone should regard these principles, these proposals as the major issues? Why? We do not regard them as the most important. We wish to discuss them, we do not ignore them; on the contrary, we intend to discuss them, but in connexion with the discussion of the treaty we have been instructed to draw up. And we are discussing them in relation to our own position and that of other countries.

(The Chairman, USSR)

The representative of the United States said that our positions must be compared. We agree with this and it is in fact what we are doing. And everyone here is a witness to the fact that we compare our preamble with the preamble contained in the draft programme of the United States. We are now talking about article 1, which lists the basic provisions and defines the essence of general and complete disarmament. We compare this with what is contained in the programme of the United States. So we are comparing positions. If you think it necessary to make any additions to or modifications in your position, we are prepared to discuss them thoroughly and fully. We do not refuse to do this at all. But when you propose that all this should be set aside and that we should first embark on a further discussion of four particular issues which you regard as of major importance, we say no. We cannot work in this way. Why should we set aside everything which is already before us and which in fact represents a blueprint of a future agreement? Why should we set it aside? Why should we go back and try to examine the problem of nuclear disarmament separately? This is an unsound approach. It has failed to yield results in the past and cannot yield any positive results now.

I am saying this in order to make it clear that this is not a whim of ours and that it is not a question of our wanting any sort of priority. Nothing of the kind. Our treaty stands side by side with your programme. Let us discuss them together. We are beginning to discuss our treaty and you are free to put forward your own proposals regarding your programme. Who objects to this? There is no one who objects.

Mr. Godber, however, expressed one idea with regard to our method of work which seems to me sound, and his view was endorsed by Mr. Dean. They both said that, within the framework of the decision the Committee has taken on its procedure of work, any questions could be discussed. I entirely agree with this. I believe that this is the way that we ought to proceed - within the framework of this decision. But this means that we must study the specific documents which already exist and examine concrete proposals in relation to these documents. Let us hear your proposals, any new suggestions you may have. We are ready to discuss them.

(The Chairman, USSR)

My second observation is this. Mr. Godber made a comment on article 1, which is what we are now discussing. I understood him to say that article 1 is in a sense a preliminary article and contains general provisions relating both to the programme of general and complete disarmament and to certain basic methods of drafting the treaty. I think the representative of India also said that article 1 was of a general nature and contained general provisions. And in fact, if you look at the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, which constitutes the basis of our work and in the light of which we have to consider specific documents, as specified in our agreed procedure of work, you will see that point 3 states: "To this end, the programme for general and complete disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions, with respect to the military establishment of every nation...". It then goes on to enumerate the basic elements of general and complete disarmament.

Sub-paragraph (a) refers to the disbanding of armed forces, the dismantling of military establishments, including bases, the cessation of the production of arms, and so forth;

Sub-paragraph (b) refers to the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction;

Sub-paragraph (c) refers to the elimination of all means of delivery of weapons;

Sub-paragraph (d) refers to the abolition of the organizations and institutions designed to organize the military effort of States; and

Sub-paragraph (e) to the discontinuance of military expenditures.

In other words, the article outlines a programme of general and complete disarmament not yet broken down into stages.

Why could we not reach agreement on how to give concrete expression to this general programme for the purposes of our future agreement? Do you really object to anything which is stated in the general principles and embodied in our article 1? Mr. Godber had an objection; he questioned the need to raise the issue of foreign military bases. Let us discuss this objection. I am quite ready to do so. I am prepared to explain in detail at the next meeting precisely why we include this particular point and why we are not satisfied with what you say. You will obviously explain your position to us. What is the possible outcome of this discussion? The outcome may be that both we and you will stand by our

(The Chairman, USSR)

positions. That is one possible outcome. In that case we will record in our joint statement of views the points on which there is no dispute, on which there is agreement. With regard to the points on which we fail to come to terms, we will indicate that disagreement remains on such and such questions. I believe that this would be a very useful piece of work, because it would then be clear to everyone that on certain questions we had reached agreement and that other questions remained in dispute. And on the second reading, as it were, of the document, during the detailed discussion, or as you call it, the drafting of the document, we could in fact return to this question and discuss it once again with a view to reaching a final decision.

The last point I wish to make is that at present we are not at all interested in reaching detailed agreement on every letter or phrase or in the drafting of the text. That is why I also spoke yesterday and, as you probably remember, said that one can go on for ever amending documents. And this is of course too time-consuming. The important thing now is to reach agreement on the substance of the proposals and ideas embodied in the various articles. This is what matters most. Apparently, this coincides with your position. You are not aiming at a final text. Nor do we insist at present on a final text. We would merely like to reach agreement, to determine whether you have any objections to the substance of the proposals contained in a given article. If you have any proposals for the inclusion of some entirely new provisions, then let us discuss them. If you wish to propose that something should be dealt with not in this article but in another article, let us discuss the matter. You mentioned article 2 and if you think that this article is related to article 37, then let us discuss article 2 and article 37 at the same time, if they are interconnected. We are quite agreeable to this. By all means let us do so.

What we want is businesslike and practical work, not general discussion or a general debate on individual problems singled out from the programme of general and complete disarmament. What we want is discussion of a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. If you agree with this, let us continue our work along these lines.

(The Chairman, USSR)

Therefore it seems to me that our position may perhaps be misunderstood or not fully understood. Attempts to evade consideration of the treaty on general and complete disarmament may even be involved. I say this because the phrase "treaty or treaties" crept into the statements of two speakers: Mr. Dean, and Mr. Cavalletti, an old friend of ours. I do not know what is meant by this. For the moment we are dealing with a single treaty, not with treaties. Let us consider this document which we have submitted. But if your intention is that we should not consider this document, that it should be removed from the table and that the Committee should consider your separate proposals, we are not prepared to agree, because we have already done a certain amount of work. Our draft treaty meets the requirements of the basic task which is now before us. Let us consider it. In our view, this applies both to your document and to our programme of general and complete disarmament. We are prepared to examine these documents at the same time. But let us move forward in accordance with a definite procedure.

We have come here for businesslike work, and we will therefore reflect on what has been said. I think that the United States representative, as a co-Chairman, will also do so. If it is necessary and essential for us to meet in order to discuss the questions raised in regard to our further work, I am entirely at the service of my co-Chairman and am prepared to discuss these questions. But I believe that the sound and businesslike character which has marked our work in the past can and should be maintained. We shall reply to the comments which were made today. We will gladly listen to any observations which the United States representative and other colleagues wish to make. We are also prepared to discuss and give our views on all the questions the United States is raising. We are prepared to discuss these questions at the appropriate time and we are quite willing at this stage to consider questions relating to the general problems now actually under discussion, that is to say, questions relating to the first chapter of our draft treaty.

I do not think there will be much disagreement among us on these questions; and when we come, say, to the question of the International Disarmament Organization, we are prepared to consider it in all its aspects. We are ready to discuss the question of armed forces at the appropriate time. We do not refuse to discuss it. The representative of Brazil was right in saying that there is a

(The Chairman, USSR)

danger of our reaching an impasse. But, in my view, we can still proceed in the normal way, discussing the questions which have already been put forward, which are being discussed in connexion with appropriate documents that provide a basis for a businesslike discussion. We hope that we shall be able to proceed in this way.

As Chairman, I wish to announce that the co-Chairmen have agreed to suggest that the Committee should consider the question of the progress in the discussion of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests in the Sub-Committee of Three at its meeting on 2 April. We are in agreement on this and unless the Committee has any objections, this is how we will proceed.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its twelfth meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. V.A. Zorin, representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"The representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, Italy, Poland, Brazil, the United Arab Republic, Romania, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria and India made statements.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 2 April 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.